The duality of mind and body has been a part of philosophy since the days of the early
Greek philosophers. It is evident ,for example, in the hylomorphism of Aristotle, as a variant
of his distinction between matter and form, in Plato’s idealism, and has persisted in one
form or another as philosophy evolved over time. It still represents a challenge for
epistemology, ontology and for all religions.
In the western world, the separation of mind and body was appealing and convenient since
it facilitated the concept of the soul, which in turn was stated to be a part of the self that
transcends earthly existence and was continuous into an afterlife. The quality of that
afterlife was determined by the moral status of the individual’s life prior to death.
The relationship between mind and body has yielded proponents of two polar positions,
each proposing either mind or body as the primary entity, with the other as a manifestation
or extension of the core reality. This longstanding debate became most sharply evidenced
in discussions on the nature of consciousness.
In both philosophy and medicine (the dual sources of psychology and psychotherapy) there
have been competing schools of thought on what constitutes consciousness and what status
it should be afforded. The essence of this discussion has been called the hard problem of
consciousness, i.e. how can physical processes in the brain explain subjective experiences of
the mind.
All of this has implications for models of therapy, both ideologically and for approaches to
treatment. Thus, schools of philosophy that focus on, or perhaps prioritise, what is tangible,
what can be seen and heard and touched, tend to elevate the body over the mind, often
neglecting the latter to the point where the very existence of a mind is challenged. On the
other hand, philosophies that centre on the felt subjective experience of the self as the
principal determinant of existence will see the mind as the primary entity.
This first category of philosophical approaches includes empiricist and linguistic models.
These frameworks directly underpin therapeutic approaches that also focus on what can be
sensed, and what is empirically demonstrable e.g. behaviour modification programmes. The
second category emphasises subjectivity and the reality of felt individual experience. These
include phenomenology and existentialism and provide the epistemological basis for
humanistic, person-centred and other therapies that consider felt experience as the
foundation of therapeutic progress.
Rationalist philosophies are linked with a range of therapeutic approaches that seek to
combine mind and body, where the management of cognitions is used to control and
cultivate behaviour patterns. In general these tend to side-step the question of
consciousness, taking a more pragmatic approach. If it is helpful to the client, if it delivers
improvement in the client’s well-being, is it necessary to address underlying philosophical
questions?
Teleological models e.g. logotherapy focus on a personal sense of purpose, self-worth and
felt meaning in life. Holistic perspectives in general do not address the question of mind-
body relationships or the challenge of the hard problem of consciousness. Instead, they
variously focus on the client’s significant relationship network (family therapy, systemic
approaches) or the client’s here and now configuration of his/her world (gestalt).
However, the fundamental question as to how physical events or entities can explain or
equate with subjective felt states remains problematic. It is a key issue in the philosophy of
science which looks at, inter alia, how we know what we claim to know. The problem sits
alongside the nature of evil, the dynamic between determinism and free will, and the status
of introspection as a source of valid therapeutic data, as enduring fundamental challenges.
The current state of progress in the application of scientific method to the hard problem of
consciousness centres on advances in neuroscience. Perhaps predictably, the champions of science tend to believe that it is only a matter of time before it will be possible to organically and neurologically access, analyse, and potentially manipulate what we now call subjective experience, without reference to any
non—physical construct such as the self.
While it is often possible for individual psychotherapy practitioners to ply their trade
without explicitly addressing underlying questions about the philosophy of science, and
their impact on our ability to fully understand how therapy works, it is at least beneficial to
reflect constructively on the relationship between mind and body, and especially the nature
of consciousness. In my own area of practice, addiction psychotherapy, the treatment
model in good currency is the biopsychosocial framework. This approach seeks to embrace
mind, body and consciousness as significant factors in the treatment of substance and
behavioural addictions. How this dynamic plays out in the case of an individual in the grip of
addiction, is a therapeutic challenge that may be helped by grappling with the underlying
philosophical questions.
This post was written by Frank Byrne. Frank is a Chartered Psychologist with professional activities are in two principal areas of Organisational Psychology and Addiction Psychotherapy. Frank is currently a candidate on the Doctorate in Psychotherapy in DCU and can be contacted at frank.byrne45@mail.dcu.ie
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